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What is the impact of globalisation on wages? A flourishing theoretical literature highlights trade-
induced variation in firm-specific wages as a fundamental component of wage inequality, predicting 
heterogeneous effects across tasks, occupations and skills (see Harrison et al., 2011, for a review). 
This literature points to rent-sharing as a key mechanism through which trade-created revenues are 
transmitted to wages. In European countries, collective bargaining is the most important formal rent-
sharing mechanism and plays a key role in wage determination (Venn, 2009). However, empirical 
evidence of how collective bargaining shapes the effect of trade on wages is scarce.  
In this paper we present a comprehensive empirical study of the impact of exports and offshoring on 
the wage levels of French manufacturing firms, testing for heterogeneous effects across occupational 
categories and bargaining levels.  
We use a rich dataset obtained by matching several administrative sources providing firm-level 
information on exports and imports, balance-sheet, hourly wages by occupational category, and firm- 
and industry-level wage agreements. The detailed trade is broken-down by product (at the HS6 level) 
and country or origin/destination. It allows us to overcome the potential endogeneity bias arising from 
unobserved shocks leading firms to simultaneously choose both trade flows and wages. We construct 
firm-specific instruments for exports and offshoring following the recent work by Hummels et al. 
(2014) (based on Autor et al., 2013). For each firm, we define a set of potential markets (product-
country pairs) based on pre-sample trade flows and use world demand and supply shocks specific to 
each product-country pair as exogenous shifters. The quality of our instruments requires the set of 
potential markets to be specific to each firm and stable over time, two conditions that are met in our 
data. Our results are robust to excluding markets where French firms are dominant, ensuring the 
exogeneity of the supply and demand shocks used for identification. The use of specific firm-level 
instruments for exports and offshoring allows identification of the potentially different effects of both 
activities on firms’ wages.  In our data and as in most trade datasets (e.g., Bernard et al., 2012), 
exporters tend to be also offshorers, which raises the need to control for export activity in order to 
identify the effect of offshoring and vice versa. 
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Our first empirical contribution is to provide evidence on how trade shocks are transmitted to wage 
levels. We find that both exports and offshoring shocks have a significantly positive effect on wages, 
with the elasticity being higher for exports. The results are consistent with recent theories that explain 
the export wage premium through either rent-sharing (e.g., Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009; Amiti and 
Davis, 2012; Helpman et al., 2012) or differences in workforce composition (e.g., Yeaple, 2005; 
Verhoogen, 2008; Bustos, 2011). They are also in line with the view that access to foreign goods 
through overseas production lowers costs and boosts productivity, resulting in higher wages 
(Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). 
We then perform the analysis by occupation. Theories focusing on workforce composition predict 
exports increase the marginal returns to skills (e.g., by facilitating the adoption of skill-biased 
technologies) and thus the wages of high-skilled individuals. It suggests heterogeneous effects across 
occupations, being stronger for occupations that are on average high-skilled (i.e. technical and 
managerial). Theoretical models of offshoring also predict strong heterogeneous effects. Foreign 
production reduces the wages of workers whose tasks can be offshored via a substitution effect, but 
raises the marginal productivity and wages of workers undertaking tasks complementary to the 
offshored production. Our empirical results show that export shocks have a positive effect on wages 
with no significant differences across occupations. On the contrary, we find that offshoring shocks 
lead to significantly higher wages for technicians and executives, and have no impact on the wages of 
blue- and white-collars. These findings suggest that, on average, workers in the high-skilled 
occupations are complements to overseas production, while those in the relatively low-skilled ones are 
substitutes.  
Two important messages arise. First, as predicted by theoretical models with firm heterogeneity, the 
dispersion in trade shocks generates between-firm dispersion in wages which also holds within 
occupations. Second, export and offshoring shocks prompt different changes in the production 
process, with the latter having strong redistribution effects across occupational categories (see 
Hummels et al., 2014, for similar evidence on Denmark). 
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Our second contribution is to provide evidence on how the firms’ bargaining regime shapes the effect 
of trade shocks on wages. Collective bargaining is a particularly relevant rent-sharing mechanism in 
France where the labour market institutions favour collective negotiations and a large share of the 
workforce is covered by collective wage agreements (Avouyi-Dovi et al., 2013). The French system is 
very close to that of other European countries (Du Caju et al., 2009); thus, our analysis sheds light on 
general mechanisms likely at work in other countries.  
We classify firms according to whether they are covered by firm-level, industry-level or no collective 
wage agreements. The main finding is the following: in firms with collective bargaining, the elasticity 
of wages with respect to both exports and offshoring shocks is higher than in firms with no collective 
bargaining. These results give support to the idea that, through collective negotiations, a share of the 
trade-created rents is captured by the workers. They unveil an additional source of trade-induced 
between-firm wage dispersion that arises from the heterogeneity in bargaining regimes across firms. 
The data shows differences between exports and offshoring. The effect of exports is positive 
irrespective of the bargaining regime, and higher under firm- than industry-level bargaining. This 
result mimics the findings of closed economy studies showing that wages tend to be more responsive 
to profitability shocks under firm- than industry-level bargaining (e.g., Gürtzgen, 2009). We find a 
negative effect of offshoring shocks in firms without collective agreements. It suggests that, absent 
formal rent-sharing agreements, the productivity gains associated with offshoring accrue to the firms’ 
shareholders. Finally, the wage gains are similar across worker categories. Collective bargaining does 
not appear to reduce the wage inequalities across categories associated with offshoring.  
We contribute to the burgeoning empirical literature on trade and wages, which has thus far mainly 
analysed the impact of exports and offshoring separately (see Feenstra and Hanson, 2003 and Harrison 
et al., 2011 for surveys), and to a small literature focusing on the role of collective bargaining, notably 
Kramarz (2010) and Felbermayr et al. (2014). We complement previous works by identifying the 
distinct effect of both trade activities in the same firm with instrumental variables, by unveiling 
heterogeneous responses across occupations and by using detailed data on bargaining regimes. Our 
results also contribute to the literature on collective bargaining in closed economies (e.g., Dahl et al., 
5 
 
2013), by using trade as exogenous shocks to identify heterogeneous effects according to the 
bargaining regimes. 
Our paper is organised as follows. Section 1 provides a brief theoretical background. Section 2 
describes the data sources and the estimating sample. Section 3 presents the empirical model and the 
construction of the instrumental variables. Section 4 studies how trade shocks affect firm-level wages, 
on average and by occupation. Section 5 focuses on the role of the bargaining regime. Section 6 
concludes. 
1. Theoretical Background 
A large body of theoretical work studying the impact of trade on wages has flourished in recent years. 
This literature focuses on the impact of trade on wage dispersion between firms. It constitutes a major 
departure from traditional trade theories that placed the emphasis on wage differences between 
occupations and sectors. The recent theories generate a rich set of predictions linking firm-specific 
wages to firms’ trade participation that provide the background of our empirical analysis.  
The literature builds upon the seminal contribution by Melitz (2003) that features firm heterogeneity in 
productivity and fixed export costs. Trade liberalisation reallocates market shares towards the more 
productive firms and raises their profits, while it leads the least productive ones to exit. In the original 
Melitz model, the heterogeneity in profits and trade status of firms does not translate into wage 
heterogeneity because all workers are homogenous and labour markets are frictionless. Theoretical 
models generating wage variations between firms depart from those assumptions and can be roughly 
classified in two groups: ‘workforce composition’ and ‘rent-sharing’.  
The first set of papers allows for worker heterogeneity in skills while maintaining the assumption of 
competitive labour markets. Wages reflect marginal productivities. Firms that enter the export market 
adopt more skilled-intensive technologies that raise returns to skills in those firms. In equilibrium, 
exporters employ better workers and pay higher average wages than non-exporters. Representative 
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examples of this class of models are those by Yeaple (2005) and Bustos (2011).1 The effects of 
offshoring are also heterogeneous across workers, and depend on how each type of worker interacts 
with the imported goods in the production process. Offshoring boosts the marginal productivity and 
demand for workers with tasks complementary to the imported goods, affecting their wages positively. 
It leads to wage and employment losses for workers who are substitutes to the imported goods 
(Feenstra and Hanson, 1999). It is generally assumed that skilled workers are complementary to 
offshored production.  
The second group of models generates a true ‘trade wage premium’ since wages are above marginal 
productivities. Rent-sharing implies wages are an increasing function of profits and arises in the 
presence of labour market frictions. Models of the exporter wage premium with rent-sharing are based 
on fair wage considerations (Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009; Egger et al., 2013; Amiti and Davis, 
2012), efficiency wages (Davis and Harrigan, 2011) or search-and-matching frictions with individual 
bargaining (Felbermayr et al., 2011; Helpman et al., 2012). Offshoring wage premia can also be 
generated through rent-sharing mechanisms because offshoring lowers costs and raises profits, 
creating a surplus that can be shared with workers. The ‘productivity effect’ of offshoring has been 
formalised by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and is in line with available evidence on the 
effects of imported inputs on productivity (Amiti and Konings, 2007). Amiti and Davis (2012) develop 
a Melitz-type model with fair wages. Sethupathy (2013) models bilateral bargaining between workers 
and offshoring firms.  
A set of models studies collective bargaining as a particular rent-sharing mechanism, with wages 
determined through bargaining between firms and trade unions. The general prediction is that 
reductions in trade costs lead to a positive correlation between exports and wages (e.g., Naylor, 1998 
and 1999, Bastos and Kreickemeier, 2009). There is an established literature modelling the wage 
effects of offshoring when wages are set through collective bargaining. Offshoring provides the firm 
with an outside option in the bargain, leading to heterogeneous wage effects across workers. When 
local and foreign workers are substitutes, the threat of moving production abroad constrains union 
                                                     
1
 Verhoogen (2008) highlights the role of quality upgrading, and Burstein and Vogel (2012) and Harrigan and 
Reshef (forthcoming) assume more productive firms use more skill-intensive technologies. 
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wage demands, generating a negative relationship between offshoring and union wages. The opposite 
effect is expected when local and foreign workers are complements (Skaksen and Sorensen, 2001 and 
Lommerud et al., 2009).  
The effect of collective bargaining on wages is the subject of an extensive literature. Of interest to our 
analysis is how the level of centralisation of bargaining affects wage outcomes (e.g., Calmfors and 
Driffill, 1988). A general prediction is that wages are more tightly linked to profits under firm-level 
than under more centralised bargaining levels (i.e., industry or national), because trade unions are 
concerned with idiosyncratic profitability shocks (see Gürtzgen, 2009 for empirical evidence).  Most 
available evidence shows wage levels are higher under firm- than under industry-level bargaining, 
especially in countries with multi-level bargaining systems (e.g., Card and de la Rica, 2006; Plasman 
et al., 2007; Dahl et al., 2013). Another relevant issue is whether collective bargaining reduces 
inequalities within firms by compressing the wage distribution. The general consensus is that this is 
the case, as illustrated in the textbook treatment of Cahuc et al. (2014) and the empirical survey in 
Card et al. (2004).  
2. Data  
We match data from four administrative sources with firm-level information on imports and exports, 
balance-sheet data, wages, and collective wage agreements. We now describe the data sources and 
explain the construction of our estimating sample. Table 1 presents the data sources succinctly. 
[Insert Table 1] 
2.1 Data Sources 
Trade data: The trade data come from an exhaustive administrative file collected by the French 
Customs. The yearly value of imports (by country of origin and product) and exports (by country of 
destination and product) are reported for all firms over the period 1996-2009. Trade flows are 
originally classified at the CN 8-digit level (EU - Combined Nomenclature) but we aggregate them at 
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the 6-digit level of the Harmonised System (HS6) to construct our instruments. We restrict our sample 
to imports and exports of manufactured goods by manufacturing firms.2  
The theory reviewed in Section 1 points out that the effect of offshoring on wages potentially differs 
according to whether the imported goods complement or substitute for activities that can be 
undertaken within the firm. In light of this, for each firm in our sample we want to have an empirical 
measure of offshoring that captures the transfer abroad of production activities that were carried out 
(or could have been carried out) by the same firm in France. Within the firm, these goods produced 
with foreign labour are more likely to substitute for domestic labour. In order to construct such 
measure we apply the methodology developed by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) which has become 
standard in the offshoring literature (Biscourp and Kramarz, 2007, also apply it to French data). The 
idea is to include only imports of goods that are close to the final output produced by the firm. In 
practice, for each firm in the sample we keep only those imported goods that belong to the industry 
where the firm operates.3 We then sum the remaining imports flows for each firm and each year, 
obtaining the firm-year measure of offshoring that we use throughout the paper.4 Feenstra and Hanson 
(1999) and Hummels et al. (2014) label this ‘narrow offshoring’, but for simplicity we use the term 
‘offshoring’ throughout. The above definition should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. As 
a robustness check, we provide the results obtained using total imports as a measure of offshoring in 
Appendix D.  
Balance sheet data: The administrative BRN dataset (‘Bénéfices Réels Normaux’) is constructed from 
tax records and provides us with balance-sheet information on sales, employment, material usage, 
capital stock and main sector of activity at the 5-digit NAF Rev2 level (NAF = French classification of 
                                                     
2
 We exclude raw materials (HS01-15, 23, 25-27, 31 and 41) e.g., ‘Vegetable products’, ‘Mineral products’, 
‘Fertilizers’ and ‘Works of art, collector’s pieces and antiques’, and ‘Services’ (HS97-99). Excluded trade 
flows are about 5% of the total value of French imports and exports.  
3
 More specifically, we use a concordance table provided by Eurostat (from the RAMON Metadata Server) to 
map HS6 codes into the European product classification CPA2008. The CPA2008 is identical to the French 
product classification CPFRev2. Finally, we use concordance tables from INSEE to map CPFRev2 product 
codes into NAFRev2 4-digit industry codes (see ‘Balance sheet data’). With this classification in hand, for 
each firm we drop all imports of HS6 codes that do not map into their NAF code. 
4
 To have a better understanding of this measure, take for example the HS6 code 701932 ‘Thin sheets (voiles) of 
Glass Fibres’. When this code is imported by firms in the NAF code 2314 ‘Manufacture of Glass Fibers’ we 
keep these imports in our measure of offshoring for those firms. When the same code is imported by the firms 
in the NAF code 2399 ‘Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products’ we exclude it from the offshoring 
measure for these firms. 
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economic activities, the first four digits of which are identical to the NACE Rev2 classification). It 
includes over 60% of French firms and accounts for over 90% of the value of trade flows in the 
Customs dataset. We use the BRN data to estimate firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) as the 
residual of a two-factor (capital and labour) Cobb-Douglas production function, separately for each 2-
digit industry using data on 1,026,147 observations over the period 1994-2009. Our preferred measure 
uses the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method.  
Wage data: The administrative dataset DADS (‘Déclarations Annuelles de Données Sociales’) comes 
from firms’ social security records. For the period 2005-2009 and for every plant with at least one 
employee, it provides the number of workers and hourly wages, both overall and for each of the 
following occupations: ‘Administrative and commercial executives (including engineers)’, 
‘Technicians and supervisors’, ‘White-collar employees’, ‘Production (blue collar) workers’. 
Occupational categories are defined on the ‘Nomenclature des professions et catégories 
socioprofessionnelles’ (PCS).5 The number of temporary contracts at the firm that we use as a control 
also comes from DADS. 
Wage agreements data: We use comprehensive information on wage agreements signed at the firm- 
and industry- levels, for each firm and year in the period 1994-2009. The data comes from the French 
Ministry of Labour and it is exhaustive, given the legal obligation to report on all concluded firm-level 
agreements. Variables included are the date and topics of the agreements. Agreements can cover a 
variety of topics other than wages (see Appendix Table A1 for details). We focus on firm-level 
agreements dealing with wages because they are more likely to affect the wage-setting process and 
also because wages are the most frequent topic dealt with (over 70%). We also have information on 
wage agreements at the industry-level for the 300 largest industries (branches in French) for 1994-
2009, constructed by Avouyi-Dovi et al. (2013). 
                                                     
5
 Although this variable refers to occupations, it has often been used to proxy for the workers’ skill level (e.g., 
Cahuc et al., 2006).  
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2.2 Estimating Sample 
Our estimating sample is obtained by matching the above datasets using a common firm identifier.6 
We clean the data in the following way. We drop outliers of hourly wages (overall and by occupation) 
and of sales per employee.7 The data show the existence of a substantial share of firms with marginal 
trade activity. We normalise export and offshoring values by total sales, and look at their distribution 
in our sample. Both distributions exhibit a large mass of observations with very low values: the 5th 
percentile of the export-to-sales ratio is 0.2%, whereas the median is 15% (0.03% and 3% for 
offshoring). Firms with negligible exposure to international trade can contaminate our results as 
potential outliers. In light of this we drop firm-year observations for which the export-to-sales or the 
offshoring-to-sales ratio are below the 5th percentile of the distribution.8 
We include firms only in the years in which they both import and export, a restriction required for the 
implementation of our IV strategy (defined below). Hence, our study focuses on how changes in the 
intensive margin of trade affect wages. Our results need to be interpreted as informative of how wages 
are affected by shocks allowing firms to deepen their trade activities conditional on the firm being 
exporter and importer. Obtaining results applying to all firms would require accounting for the 
endogeneity of entry into the export and import markets (i.e., the ‘extensive margin’). Such strategy 
would require at least one instrumental variable that predicts the change in trade status of firms. Such 
instrument is difficult to obtain in absence of a major policy change. Furthermore, identification of the 
extensive margin is made difficult by the limited variation in trade status over time. Firms that both 
export and import tend to do it continuously over the period 1996-2009, with a mass of firms that 
never enter foreign markets in our sample (Appendix Figure B2).  
Our estimating sample contains 23,269 observations corresponding to 8,123 firms and accounts for 
over two thirds of the total value of both exports and imports of the Customs dataset. The sample 
period is 2005-2009 because our dependent variables (i.e. firm-level hourly wages) are only available 
                                                     
6
 We provide online the programmes that allow the replication of our results, along with details on how to access 
the confidential data used in the paper. 
7
 We define outliers as observations below the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile of the distribution. 
8
 In Appendix Table B1 we report robustness checks using different thresholds of trade intensity (instead of 5% 
and including no trimming). We obtain similar results. 
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for those years (Table 1). It exhibits large between-firm variation in both trade and wages, but limited 
within-firm variability. Identification will mainly come from differences between firms rather than 
from variations over time for a given firm. This feature of the data is not the consequence of the 
relatively short sample period: very similar patterns emerge over the longer period 1996-2009 
(Appendix Table B3). Hauptmann and Schmerer (2013) also raise a similar issue for German firms.  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics based on our estimating sample. Exports and offshoring increased 
steadily from 2005 to 2008, before dropping sharply in 2009. The hourly wage of blue- and white-
collar workers increased on average by a little less than 3% whereas the hourly wage of supervisors 
and executives slightly dropped in 2009. We will test whether our results are robust to the Great 
Recession by reporting results excluding the year 2009 as robustness checks. 
[Insert Table 2] 
3. Empirical Model 
This section describes the empirical model and the instrumentation strategy. 
3.1 Wage Equation 
Our baseline wage equation is the following: 
ln = 	
 ln  + ln  + 	 +  +  	+                       (1) 
where for the firm i in year t ln is the log net hourly wage, ln  the log exports and ln  the 
log offshoring.  is a vector of covariates including the local unemployment rate and firm-level 
controls in year t (number of employees, TFP, domestic sales, proportion of temporary workers, share 
of skilled workers and capital-labour ratio).  	is a random firm-specific effect,  is a year dummy 
(common to all firms) and  is an i.i.d. random term (white noise) with mean 0 and variance . 
Slope parameters 	
 and  are interpreted as elasticities of wages with respect to firm exports 
and offshoring.  
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The identification strategy will mainly exploit between-firm variation, consistently with trade theories 
of firm heterogeneity. To control for observable firm heterogeneity we add disaggregate industry (4-
digit)-level dummies and adopt a Mundlak’s formulation of the linear panel data model, by adding the 
firm’s average TFP and the firm’s average capital/labour ratio to the list of regressors. Since all these 
supplementary variables are time-invariant, we assume a random firm-specific effect  .	 The 
Mundlak formulation allows for possible correlations between the time-varying explanatory variables 
and the firm-specific fixed effects. 
The theoretical works reviewed in Section 1 predict the relationship between trade and wages can be 
heterogeneous according to worker categories and bargaining regimes. We will estimate equation (1) 
using average wages, then separately by occupational category and by bargaining regime.  
3.2 Instrumentation Strategy 
We face a potential endogeneity issue: unobservable shocks might simultaneously affect wages, export 
and offshoring flows in a given firm and a given year, making OLS estimates of 	
 and 
 
inconsistent. To reduce these potential biases we use instrumental variables that reflect exogenous 
shocks to the profitability of exporting and offshoring and are uncorrelated with firm-level wage-
setting. A recent strand of the literature shows such instruments can be constructed using demand and 
supply shocks from the rest of the world (e.g., Autor et al., 2013; Hummels et al., 2014). The 
underlying idea is the following. A shock to the demand of a given product p in a given country c 
would translate into higher imports into country c of this particular product p. French firms exporting 
the product p to country c would raise their exports to that country. Similarly, an increase in world 
exports of product p by country c reflects an increase in the competitiveness of country c for the 
product p (which can be due to an exogenous variation in productivity, costs or product quality in 
country c). French firms importing product p from country c would respond to this shock by 
increasing their imports of product p from the country c. Exogeneity is ensured by the fact that 
demand and supply shocks in foreign locations are independent of French firms’ wage determination.  
World demand  and world supply 	 addressed to firm i in year t are: 
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"

",

																																 = !"
"

",

 
where "
 and 	"
 are respectively world demand and supply for a product-country pair at time 
t computed using data at the 6-digit level of the Harmonised System HS from the BACI dataset 
constructed by CEPII.9 We calculate the firm-specific shares s%&'	of each pair (product p, country c) in 
total exports (respectively, offshoring) using average shares of the products actually exported 
(respectively, imported) in the period 1996-2004. We choose to use pre-samples values to reduce 
endogeneity concerns. For the few firms entering foreign markets within our sample period, we 
calculate these shares for the first year in which the firm reports positive trade (and we include the 
firm in the sample from its second year onwards).10  
The quality and the precision of our instrumentation strategy depend on whether the set of product-
country pairs entering  and	 is stable over time. Over the period 1996-2009, firm-level 
export and offshoring flows tend to be concentrated in one main (HS6) product and one country. The 
two main products represent on average 83% of firm-level exports, and the two main product-country 
pairs account for 57% (90% and 80% for offshoring respectively, see Appendix Table C1). 
Furthermore, the average firm changes its main product only once during the sample period (often 
replaced with a very close product). The set of products and countries that constitute the firms’ 
potential markets is quite stable over time. Our instrumentation strategy that relies on pre-sample trade 
composition to compute firm-specific world demand and supply is satisfactory.  
A second concern is whether the instruments provide enough between-firm variation for identification. 
If the set of product-country pairs is specific to each firm, world demand and supply shocks will affect 
each firm differently. To look into this feature of the data, for every firm in the sample we identify the 
two most important product-country pairs, defined as those that account for the highest share in total 
exports. We then compute the frequency of firms having the same two most important product-country 
                                                     
9The BACI dataset is constructed using bilateral trade data at HS 6-digit level from COMTRADE. It can be 
downloaded at http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=1 (last accessed: 11 December 
2014) 
10
 As a robustness check, we have also computed instruments using shares calculated over the period 1996-2009 
as in Berman et al. (2012). Results are very similar. 
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pairs (we do the same for offshoring). The median is 2 firms for exports and 3 firms for offshoring 
(see Appendix Table C2 for further details). The set of product-country pairs is quite specific to each 
firm.11  
Our instrumentation equation is: 
ln  = ()*	
 ln + ()+	
 ln + (	
 + 	
 + 	
 	+ ,                 (2.A) 
ln  = ()*ln + ()+ ln + ( +  +  	+ -                 (2.B) 
where  is a vector of firm-level controls identical to the one used for the estimation of (1). 	
 and 
 are year dummies (common to all firms), and , and - are i.i.d. random terms (white noises) 
with mean 0 and variances . and /, respectively. The estimation of (2.A) and (2.B) yield 
consistent estimates of ln  and ln  which are denoted ln 0  and ln 1 .12 
[Insert Table 3] 
Table 3 reports the results. They constitute the first-stage regressions of our empirical strategy. Results 
are reported with and without the vector of controls  ,	but including firm-specific fixed effects and 
year dummies in all cases. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. As expected, world 
demand (respectively, supply) has a positive and statistically significant effect on exports 
(respectively, offshoring). The values of the F-statistics indicate that these instruments are not weak. 
The estimates show that size, productivity, and capital- and skill-intensity are associated with larger 
values of firm-level offshoring and exports, consistent with firm heterogeneity theories of international 
trade. Their inclusion reduces the magnitude of the coefficient associated with the instruments, 
without affecting their significance levels. 
                                                     
11
 A similar issue can arise if world demand and supply shocks are highly correlated between countries. This 
could happen if shocks in large countries drive most of the variability in world demand and supply. As 
robustness check, we ran equations (2.A) and (2.B) excluding France’s three largest trade partners (China, 
Germany and the United States) which represent about 30% of total French exports and imports. We obtain 
similar results (Appendix Table C3). 
12
 We have also tested exchange rates as possible instruments but they were found to have a small or even 
insignificant impact on exports and imports (results are reported in Appendix Table C4). This is due to the 
large share of French trade within the Euro area (about 50%), implying a small variability in average exchange 
rates. Moreover, this instrument varies only with the country and time dimensions.  
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The validity of the above results relies on the exogeneity of world demand and supply shocks. Shocks 
to French firms can trigger demand and supply responses in markets where French firms have a large 
market share, challenging the exogeneity of  and . For robustness we use the BACI data to 
compute the market shares of French firms in each product-country-year cell, for exports and for 
offshoring. We then run equations (2.A) and (2.B) dropping product-country-year observations for 
which the French market shares are over 10%, 15%, or 20%, obtaining very similar results (see 
Appendix Table C5).  
4. How Does Trade Affect Wage Levels? 
In this section we study the impact of international trade on firm-level wages. We start by looking at 
average firm-level wages, and we then examine heterogeneity across occupations.  
4.1 Results on Average Firm-level Wages  
As discussed in Section 1, the first message that comes out of recent theoretical works is that firm-
level wages should be affected by firm-level trade. Most theoretical models predict exports should 
have a positive effect, irrespective of the particular underlying channel (i.e. composition or rent-
sharing). The effect of offshoring is a priori ambiguous because it results from the combination of two 
opposing forces. Offshoring might boost productivity and raise profits, positively affecting wages (the 
‘productivity effect’). However, offshoring can replace tasks previously carried out by domestic 
workers, leading to lower wages for those workers.  
In Figure 1 we pool all observations in our sample and plot the firm-level average hourly wages (in 
euros) as a function of percentiles of the distribution of exports and offshoring per employee. Both 
variables are positively correlated with firm-level wages. At the aggregate level and without any 
controls, the positive effect of offshoring on wages seems to dominate.  
[Insert Figure 1] 
We now proceed to a formal econometric analysis. In Table 4 we report the results obtained for 
different specifications of equation (1). The dependent variable is the log hourly net wage rate in firm i 
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and year t. Columns (1) and (3) report OLS estimates, respectively without and with firm-level 
controls. Columns (2) and (4) report the second stage of OLS-IV estimates, where exports and 
offshoring (in logs) are instrumented through the first-stage regressions reported in Table 3. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
The main finding is that both exports and offshoring have a highly significant positive effect on 
wages. This result is in line with the theoretical prediction concerning the effects of exports on average 
wages, and suggests the positive effects of offshoring dominate the negative ones (as was already 
suggested by Figure 1). The introduction of firm-level controls substantially decreases the size of both 
elasticities, from 0.02 to 0.01 in the case of exports and from 0.01 to 0.004 in the case of offshoring. 
Hummels et al. (2014) argue that including firm-level performance covariates controls for the indirect 
impact of trade on wages through enhanced productivity. Under this view, columns (3) and (4) provide 
the effects of exports and offshoring net of this ‘productivity effect’. Even when adding firm-level 
controls we find a positive and significant impact of both trade activities on wages.13 These average 
results might mask heterogeneity across worker categories. We explore such hypothesis in the next 
subsection.  
[Insert Table 4] 
4.2  Results by Occupation 
A second message arising from the literature survey is that the impact of trade on wages can 
potentially vary with the workers’ occupation and skills. Models based on ‘workforce composition’ 
predict export shocks should lead to the adoption of skill-biased technology and increase the marginal 
returns to skills. A higher elasticity in the case of high-skilled occupations (i.e., technicians and 
executives) would be in line with the idea that export shocks increase the marginal productivity of 
high-skilled workers and their wages. The impact of offshoring is potentially quite different. The 
theory suggests it should also be heterogeneous across workers, being positive for those who are 
complements to the imported goods, and negative for those who are substitutes. Our hypothesis is that 
                                                     
13
 Results are robust to the exclusion of the year 2009 (Appendix Table D1) and to using total imports instead of 
‘offshoring’ (Appendix Table D2). 
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high-skilled occupations, such as engineers and executives, are more likely to be complements to 
offshoring, whereas low-skilled occupations, mainly production workers, are more likely to be 
substitutes.  
[Insert Figure 2] 
In Figure 2 we repeat the analysis conducted in Figure 1, but this time separately for each of the four 
occupational categories. It is clear that the positive correlation between exports and wages exists for 
all occupations. The relationship between offshoring and wages seems to be much steeper for 
technicians and executives, which provides a motivation for running the basic wage regressions of 
equation (1) separately by occupational categories.  
[Insert Table 5] 
Table 5 presents the results. The dependent variable is the log hourly average net wage rate of 
occupation o in firm i and year t. All regressions include the full set of firm-level covariates.  
The results are striking. The elasticity of wages with respect to exports is similar for all occupations 
and for both estimation techniques (about 0.005). The results do not show evidence of redistribution 
effects across groups of workers due to foreign demand shocks. The offshoring results are quite 
different: offshoring has no impact on the average wage of blue- and white-collars but leads to 
significantly higher wages for technicians (elasticity of 0.004) and executives (elasticity of 0.007). As 
we have argued, it is reasonable to expect these occupations to be more likely to be complements to 
offshoring. The results in Table 5 thus suggest that a better access to foreign goods through offshoring 
generates a substantial reorganisation of home production, which on average benefits the most skilled 
occupations.14 Unlike previous studies (e.g., Hummels et al 2014) we do not find negative effects on 
the low-skilled occupations. One possible explanation that we explore in the next section might be 
related to the role of wage bargaining institutions in affecting wage outcomes.  
Our estimates show trade shocks generate between-firm dispersion in wages, both on average and 
within occupations. One main theoretical explanation of such a link is the following: trade generates 
                                                     
14
 Results are also robust to the exclusion of the year 2009 (Appendix Table D3) and to considering total imports 
instead of ‘offshoring’ (Appendix Table D4).  
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dispersion in firm revenues which are then transmitted to wages via a rent-sharing mechanism. 
Collective bargaining is a rent-sharing mechanism which we believe to be particularly relevant in 
France (as in many European countries).  
5. How Does Collective Bargaining Shape the Effect of Trade on Wages? 
The institutional features of collective wage bargaining in France are very similar to that of other 
European countries (Du Caju et al., 2009). Wages can be set at three different levels: (i) at the national 
level, a binding minimum wage is set by the government; (ii) at the industry-level, employers’ 
organisations and unions bargain on wage scales by occupational categories; (iii) at the firm level, 
employers and unions bargain on wage increases that can be uniform for all employees or specific to 
occupational categories. There is a strict hierarchy between the different levels of wage bargaining: a 
collective agreement must set forth, broaden or enhance an agreement which has been previously 
signed at a higher bargaining level. Industry-level wage agreements cover around 75% the firms in our 
sample and firm-level wage agreements cover about 20% (Table 2).  
In France, the occurrence of wage agreements is persistent over time within firms. To study whether 
the effect of trade on wages differs according to the wage bargaining regime we group firms in three 
different regimes: 1) firms not covered by any type of wage agreement (or covered only very 
infrequently), 2) firms frequently covered only by industry-level agreements, and 3) firms that 
frequently sign firm-level agreements. We consider that a firm is ‘frequently’ covered by an 
agreement of either type if it reports agreements in over 20% of the years it appears in the sample 
(20% is the sample average frequency).  
We estimate equation (1) separately for firms in each regime, first by considering average firm-level 
wages, then for each occupational category.15  
5.1 Results by Bargaining Level: Average Firm-level Wages 
                                                     
15
 Regimes are assumed to be exogenous since there is no instrument available. 
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The rent-sharing hypothesis leads us to expect a higher elasticity in firms with collective bargaining, 
indicating a stronger transmission of trade shocks to wages. Table 6 presents the results. To save space 
we report only the OLS-IV estimates, where exports and offshoring are instrumented through the first-
stage regressions reported in Table 3.  
[Insert Table 6] 
The main message of the table is the following: in firms with collective bargaining the elasticity of 
wages with respect to both exports and offshoring shocks is higher than in firms with no collective 
bargaining (i.e., comparing across columns). It provides support to the idea that, through collective 
agreements, firms share the trade-created rents with workers in the form of higher wages. One 
important consequence is that the heterogeneity in bargaining regimes (Table 2) adds an additional 
source of wage dispersion between firms. 
Interestingly, the effect of exports is estimated to be highest under firm-level bargaining (0.010 versus 
0.015 with firm-level agreements). The theoretical survey of Section 1 tells us that the elasticity of 
wages to profitability shocks should be higher the more decentralised the bargaining level: wages are 
more tied to profits under firm- than industry-level bargaining. Our results, by using exports shocks as 
measures of exogenous demand shocks, contribute to the closed economy literature that has mainly 
focused on comparing wage levels across bargaining regimes (e.g., Card and de la Rica, 2006; 
Plasman et al., 2007; Dahl et al., 2013). 
A second interesting result concerns offshoring. In Table 4 of Section 4 we found that, pooling all 
firms irrespectively of their bargaining regimes, offshoring affects wages positively. The comparison 
with Table 6 shows that the average effect arises from the combination of heterogeneous responses 
according to the bargaining regime. Wages are negatively affected by offshoring shocks in firms 
without collective agreements: the elasticity is -0.001 for 2005-2009 and -0.004 when we exclude the 
crisis year 2009. Wages are positively affected in firms covered by industry-level agreements 
(elasticity 0.004). By affecting their marginal productivity differently, offshoring leads to wage losses 
for workers who are substitutes to foreign production and to wage gains for those who are 
complements. With rent-sharing, workers extract a larger share of the surplus created by offshoring 
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adding a positive effect on wages. This mechanism can lead to an overall positive effect of offshoring 
under collective bargaining.  
Overall our estimates support the idea that bargaining results in wage gains. One open question is 
whether such gains accrue to all worker categories or they are reaped by some occupations, for 
instance because of differences in bargaining power.  
5.2 Results by Bargaining Level and by Occupation 
Table 7 presents estimates of equation (1) separately for firms in each regime and for each 
occupational category. A key general result is that the elasticity of wages with respect to trade shocks 
is higher under collective bargaining for all categories. 
[Insert Table 7] 
The regressions by occupation confirm that the export premium is largest under firm-level bargaining. 
In particular, for blue-collar workers, the elasticity of wages to export shocks goes from 0.004 without 
collective bargaining, to 0.011 when there is a firm-level wage agreement. This difference is broadly 
similar for other worker categories (with the exception of white-collar workers for which the gains are 
zero).  
Our results also reveal interesting patterns concerning offshoring. For the low-skilled occupations (i.e., 
blue- and white-collars) the effect of offshoring on wages is negative in firms with no collective 
agreements (being stronger and more significant for 2005-2008), and zero or slightly positive in firms 
with collective agreements. For the high-skilled occupations (i.e., technicians and executives) it goes 
from zero to positive. Quantitatively, the difference in the elasticity across regimes is similar for all 
categories (around 0.004 points). Collective bargaining does not appear to reduce the wage differences 
across occupations arising from offshoring shocks, but rather to shift wages up for all worker types.16  
For robustness, we looked at whether the results are driven by agreements on wages and not by 
agreements on other topics. We find that the effect of exports is higher in firms that frequently bargain 
                                                     
16
 Similar results are obtained when we replace « offshoring » by « total imports » (Appendix Table D5). 
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on any topic, but that such result is driven mainly by the existence of wage agreements (see Appendix 
Table D6).17  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we study how trade affect firm-level wage levels using rich data for French 
manufacturing firms. We provide results on the effect of exports and offshoring shocks on average 
wages, analysing heterogeneous effects across occupations and bargaining regimes. We use our 
detailed trade data to construct firm-specific instrumental variables based on world demand and supply 
shocks. This strategy allows us to overcome potential endogeneity biases arising from unobservable 
shocks leading firms to adjust wages and trade flows simultaneously.  
We first focus on the following question ‘How does trade affect wage levels?’ We find that both 
exports and offshoring have a positive impact on average wages, with the elasticity being higher for 
export (0.010) than for offshoring (0.004). This result is in line with the theoretical predictions of 
models of the exporter wage premium and suggests the positive effects of offshoring (e.g., through 
enhanced productivity) dominate the negative ones related to the substitution of domestic labour. 
We then study whether there is heterogeneity according to occupational categories. The elasticity of 
wages to export shocks is similar across all worker categories (about 0.005). The impact of offshoring 
varies across worker types: it is close to zero for blue- and white-collars and positive and significant 
for technicians and executives (with elasticities of 0.004 and 0.007 respectively). It provides support to 
the hypothesis that unskilled workers tend to be substitutes to offshoring and skilled ones to be 
complements.  
We conclude with an analysis of whether collective bargaining shapes the transmission of trade shocks 
to wages. We find that the elasticity of wages to both exports and offshoring shocks is higher in firms 
with collective bargaining than in firms with no collective bargaining. The effect of exports is higher 
under firm- than under industry-level bargaining (elasticities are 0.015 with firm-level agreements and 
                                                     
17
 There is no difference of the effect of offshoring on wages with or without firm-level agreements. The main 
difference comes from being or not covered by collective bargaining (i.e., firm- or industry-level agreements) 
as shown above. 
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0.010 without). Concerning offshoring, the estimates shows a negative impact in firms without 
collective agreements and a positive impact in firms covered by industry-level agreements. As 
theoretical models predict, collective agreements shift trade-created rents to workers in the form of 
higher wages. The wage gains associated with collective bargaining are found to be similar across 
occupations. 
Overall, our results support the predictions of firm heterogeneity models stating that trade generates 
between-firm dispersion in wages. Furthermore, such between-firm dispersion is enhanced by the 
heterogeneity in bargaining regimes across firms, generating heterogeneous transmission of trade 
shocks to wages.  
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Table 1: Data Sources 
 
Name (source) Period Main variables 
DADS – firm level  
(INSEE) 2005-2009 
- Average hourly wages by occupation (blue collar, 
white collar, technicians and executives)  
- Total hours worked by occupation 
- Nr of employees with a temporary contract 
‘Douanes’  
(French Customs) 1996-2009 
Firm-level flows of exports and imports (in euros) collected at 
the product level (HS 6) and by country of destination or origin 
Firm-level agreements 
(Ministry of Labour) 1994-2009 
Dummy variables equal to 1 if there is an agreement in a given 
firm in a given year, 0 otherwise. Main topics of the agreement 
(wages, union rights…)  
Industry-level agreements 
(Avouyi-Dovi et al.,2013) 1994-2009 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a wage agreement in a 
given industry in a given year, 0 otherwise. Cover about 300 of 
the largest industries (‘branches’). 
BRN  
(INSEE) 1996-2009 
Firms’ detailed balance sheets 
- Main variables: sales, nr of employees, materials… 
- Used to construct TFP estimates 
BACI  
(CEPII) 1996-2009 
Flows of exports (supply) and imports (demand) by country and 
at the product level (by year, for all countries) 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on Trade and Wages  
 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Trade (in millions Euros)      
- Exports 72,184.8 72,937.9 70,521.6 72,209.2 65,105.1 
- Offshoring 21,655.8 19,946.5 20,330.7 19,699.5 20,340.2 
- Total imports 47,655.1 47,981.9 48,765.3 47,648.9 41,479.3 
Average hourly wage (in Euros)     
- All workers 15.48 15.81 16.28 16.82 17.04 
- Blue-collar workers 11.75 12.07 12.46 12.91 13.29 
- White-collar workers 12.64 12.94 13.38 13.90 14.38 
- Technicians and supervisors 17.13 17.37 17.90 18.35 18.12 
- Executives 29.58 29.96 30.66 31.84 30.44 
Coverage of wage agreements (in %)     
Firm wage agreement 17.0 18.4 20.7 22.7 20.1 
Industry wage agreement 71.4 84.5 86.4 88.6 75.6 
Notes: We compute the sum (by year) of exports and offshoring for the firms observed in our sample (in millions of 
Euros). ‘Offshoring’ is defined as the value of imports of goods belonging to the same industry as that of the 
importing firm (see Section 2 for details). The average hourly wage is calculated as the average hourly wage by job 
category and by year for the firms of our sample. The coverage of wage agreements is calculated as the number of 
firms covered by a wage agreement in a given year, divided by the total number of firms.  
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Table 3: First-stage IV Regressions  
Dependent variable Exports Offshoring 
World demand (exports) 
0.150*** 0.101*** 0.141*** 0.075* 
(0.040) (0.032) (0.052) (0.046) 
World supply (imports) 
0.148*** 0.112*** 0.257*** 0.201*** 
(0.033) (0.029) (0.054) (0.053) 
TFP 
 0.375***  0.209*** 
 
(0.021)  (0.045) 
Firm size 
 0.761***  0.517*** 
 
(0.044)  (0.068) 
Capital/labour ratio 
 0.159***  0.073* 
 
(0.029)  (0.043) 
Share of high-skilled workers  
 0.006  0.288** 
 
(0.078)  (0.125) 
Domestic sales 
 -0.037** 
 0.257*** 
 
(0.019)  (0.039) 
Intercept 10.865*** 6.912*** 7.937*** 3.503*** 
(0.521) (0.538) (0.728) (0.830) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic for the IV 105.2 95.5 52.0 41.4 
Observations 23,269 23,269 23,269 23,269 
Number of firms 8,123 8,123 8,123 8,123 
Average obs. per firm 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 
Within R-squared 0.041 0.114 0.025 0.055 
Between R-squared 0.048 0.490 0.025 0.285 
Overall R-squared 0.044 0.499 0.022 0.287 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Period: 2005-2009. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level 
and reported in brackets. Year dummies and firm fixed-effects are included in all specifications. ‘Exports’ is the log 
of the value of exports. ‘Offshoring’ is the log of the value of imports of goods belonging to the same industry as 
that of the importing firm (see Section 2 for details). Firm-level controls (size, TFP, capital/labour and domestic 
sales) are in logs. Product shares entering world demand and world supply are calculated at their overall sample 
(1996-2004) firm value.  
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Table 4: Firm-level Average Hourly Wage Regressions (All Workers) 
Dependent variable Net hourly wage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Exports 0.014*** 0.022*** 0.007*** 0.010*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Offshoring 0.006*** 0.012*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
    
TFP   0.024*** 0.023*** 
  
(0.003) (0.003) 
Firm size   -0.002 -0.008*** 
  
(0.003) (0.003) 
Capital/labour   0.013*** 0.013*** 
  
(0.003) (0.003) 
Share of high-skilled 
workers   0.380*** 0.377*** 
  
(0.011) (0.011) 
Unemployment rate   -0.000 -0.000 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Temporary contracts   -0.034*** -0.035*** 
  
(0.010) (0.010) 
Domestic sales 
  0.003* 0.003 
  
(0.002) (0.002) 
Intercept 2.519*** 2.347*** 1.859*** 1.835*** (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
     
Controls No No Yes Yes 
IV No Yes No Yes 
     
Observations 23,269 23,269 23,269 23,269 
Number of firms 8,123 8,123 8,123 8,123 
R-squared 0.351 0.365 0.632 0.632 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Period: 2005-2009. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and 
reported in brackets. Year and disaggregate industry-level dummies, random firm-level effects are included in all 
specifications. ‘Net hourly wage’ is the log of the average hourly wage in the firm. ‘Exports’ is the log of the value 
of exports. ‘Offshoring’ is the log of the value of imports of goods belonging to the same industry as that of the 
importing firm (see Section 2 for details). Firm-level controls (size, TFP, capital/labour and domestic sales) are in 
logs. 
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Table 5: Firm-level Wage Regressions (by Occupation) 
Dependent 
variable Net hourly wage 
         
 Blue collar White-collar Technicians Executives 
 OLS OLS-IV OLS OLS-IV OLS OLS-IV OLS OLS-IV 
         
Exports 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.003** 0.002* 0.004*** 0.003** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Offshoring 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
        
TFP 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.012*** 0.011** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Firm size 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.018*** -0.008** -0.008** 0.013*** 0.012*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Capital/labour 0.009** 0.009** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.012** 0.012** -0.002 -0.002 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Share of high-
skilled workers  
0.028*** 0.029*** -0.006 -0.008 -0.119*** -0.120*** -0.052*** -0.055*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
Unemp. rate -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Temporary 
contracts 
-0.049*** -0.049*** -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.077*** -0.078*** -0.035* -0.037* 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) 
Domestic sales 0.004* 0.004* 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.009** 0.007* (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Intercept 1.989*** 1.991*** 2.144*** 2.135*** 2.364*** 2.360*** 2.683*** 2.675*** (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.032) (0.032) (0.039) (0.039) 
 
        
IV No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
        
Observations 23,269 23,269 23,269 23,269 23,269 23,269 23,269 23,269 
Nr of firms 8,123 8,123 8,123 8,123 8,123 8,123 8,123 8,123 
R-squared 0.416 0.416 0.258 0.258 0.186 0.186 0.186 0.187 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Period: 2005-2009. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and 
reported in brackets. Year and disaggregate industry-level dummies, random firm-level effects are included in all 
specifications. ‘Net hourly wage’ is the log of the average hourly wage by job occupation in the firm. ‘Exports’ is 
the log of the value of exports. ‘Offshoring’ is the log of the value of imports of goods belonging to the same 
industry as that of the importing firm (see Section 2 for details). Firm-level controls (size, TFP, capital/labour and 
domestic sales) are in logs. 
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Table 6: Firm-level Wage Regressions by Wage Bargaining Regime (All Workers) 
Dependent variable  Net hourly wage 
 2005-2009 2005-2008 
Firm wage agreement No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry wage agreement No Yes - No Yes - 
  
            
Exports 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.015*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
Offshoring 
-0.001 0.004*** 0.002 -0.004* 0.003*** 0.003* 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
 
      
TFP 0.021** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.023** 0.016*** 0.017*** 
 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.004) (0.005) 
Firm size 
-0.014** -0.010*** -0.007 -0.016** -0.012*** -0.009 
 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) 
Capital/labour 0.022** 0.012*** 0.009 0.022* 0.014*** 0.009 
 
(0.011) (0.005) (0.008) (0.013) (0.005) (0.008) 
Share of high-skilled 
workers  0.498*** 0.381*** 0.413*** 0.503*** 0.425*** 0.462*** 
 
(0.021) (0.013) (0.038) (0.024) (0.016) (0.059) 
Unemployment rate 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Temporary contracts 
-0.041 -0.046*** -0.041 -0.028 -0.052*** -0.058** 
 
(0.029) (0.012) (0.029) (0.031) (0.013) (0.025) 
Domestic sales 0.026** 0.004 -0.004 0.027*** 0.005* -0.003 
 
(0.012) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) 
Intercept 1.841*** 1.865*** 1.810*** 1.808*** 1.835*** 1.760*** 
(0.044) (0.030) (0.065) (0.048) (0.032) (0.064) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
      
Observations 3,509 14,683 5,077 2,726 12,181 4,138 
Number of firms 2,556 6,124 1,293 1,964 5,586 1,260 
R-Squared 0.625 0.604 0.736 0.622 0.617 0.749 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Period: 2005-2009 and 2005-2008. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level and reported in brackets. Year and disaggregate industry-level dummies, random firm-level effects are 
included in all specifications. ‘Net hourly wage’ is the log of the average hourly wage in the firm. ‘Exports’ is the 
log of the value of exports. ‘Offshoring’ is the log of the value of imports of goods belonging to the same industry as 
that of the importing firm (see Section 2 for details). Firm-level controls (size, TFP, capital/labour and domestic 
sales) are in logs. The category ‘Firm-level wage agreement’ is defined according to the frequency of firm-level 
wage agreements for a given firm, ‘Yes’ corresponds to firms that agree on wages more than 20% of years over the 
period 2002-2009, ‘No’ less than 20% of wage agreements over the same period. The category ‘Industry-level wage 
agreement’ means that a firm is covered by an industry-wage agreement in a given year. 
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Table 7: Firm-level Wage Regressions by Bargaining Regime and by Occupation 
Dependent variable  Net hourly wage 
 2005-2009 2005-2008 
Firm wage agreement No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry wage agreement No Yes - No Yes - 
Blue-collar workers 
Exports 0.004* 0.003*** 0.011*** 0.005** 0.003** 0.011*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
Offshoring 
-0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005** -0.002** 0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
       
R-Squared 0.424 0.346 0.538 0.407 0.343 0.539 
White-collar workers 
Exports 0.006** 0.007*** 0.006* 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.008** 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Offshoring 
-0.004* -0.000 0.003 -0.007*** -0.000 0.004* 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
       
R-Squared 0.276 0.202 0.364 0.248 0.189 0.374 
Technicians and supervisors       
Exports 0.005* 0.002 0.007** 0.002 0.001 0.007** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Offshoring 0.000 0.004*** 0.003 0.000 0.004*** 0.004* 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
       
R-Squared 0.208 0.168 0.340 0.210 0.172 0.346 
Executives 
   
   
Exports 0.004 0.002 0.011*** 0.005 0.001 0.011*** 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
Offshoring 0.002 0.009*** 0.006** -0.001 0.009*** 0.007** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
       
R-Squared 0.192 0.161 0.317 0.195 0.167 0.330 
 
      
Observations 3,509 14,683 5,077 2,726 12,181 4,138 
Number of firms 2,556 6,124 1,293 1,964 5,586 1,260 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Period: 2005-2009 and 2005-2008. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level and reported in brackets. Year and disaggregate industry-level dummies, random firm-level effects and 
firm-level control variables (TFP,…) are included in all specifications. ‘Net hourly wage’ is the log of the average 
hourly wage in the firm. ‘Exports’ is the log of the value of exports. ‘Offshoring’ is the log of the value of imports of 
goods belonging to the same industry as that of the importing firm (see Section 2 for details). The category ‘Firm-
level wage agreement’ is defined according to the frequency of firm-level wage agreements for a given firm, ‘Yes’ 
corresponds to firms that agree on wages more than 20% of years over the period 2002-2009, ‘No’ less than 20% of 
wage agreements over the same period. The category ‘Industry-level wage agreement’ means that a firm is covered 
by an industry-wage agreement in a given year.  
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Figure 1: Average Wages by Percentiles of the Export and Offshoring Distributions 
 
 
Notes: We report the average hourly wage in euros as a function of percentiles of the export and offshoring 
distribution. ‘Offshoring’ is defined as imports of goods belonging to the same industry as that of the importing firm 
(see Section 2 for details). We use export and offshoring per employee to control for wage differences due to firm 
size differences. We then compute percentiles of the sample distribution and calculate the average hourly wage at 
each percentile of the export and import distributions. Period: 2005-2009. 
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Figure 2: Average Wages by Percentiles of the Export and Offshoring Distributions by Occupation 
Blue-collar workers  White-collar workers 
  
Technicians and supervisors  
 
Executives 
 
Notes: We report the average hourly wage in euros as a function of percentiles of the export and offshoring 
distribution. ‘Offshoring’ is defined as imports of goods belonging to the same industry as that of the importing firm 
(see Section 2 for details). We use export and offshoring per employee to control for wage differences due to firm 
size differences. We then compute percentiles of the sample distribution and calculate the average hourly wage at 
each percentile of the export and import distributions. Period: 2005-2009. 
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APPENDIX A. Breakdown of Wage Agreements 
 
Table A1: Firm-level Agreements by Topic 
Topic  Percentage 
Wages 70.03 
Union rights 8.51 
Sex discrimination 4.81 
Employment 3.42 
On-the-job training 2.40 
Human resources management 2.09 
Disabled workers 2.04 
Labour conditions 1.97 
Job classifications 1.76 
Other topics  2.96 
Notes: Statistics are calculated using the data set of all firm level agreements on the period 2005-2009. Percentages 
are calculated as the share of each topic in all agreements.  
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Appendix B. Estimating Sample  
 
Table B1: Firm-level Average Hourly Wage Regressions (Total) – Different Samples 
Dependent variable: hourly average wage 
 
 All observations Excluding observations below 
 
 
Excl. 5th percentile Excl. 10th percentile Excl. 20th percentile 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS OLS-IV OLS OLS-IV OLS OLS-IV OLS OLS-IV 
 
        
Exports 
0.005*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.018*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Offshoring 
0.002*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 25,742 25,742 23,269 23,269 21,055 21,055 17,289 17,289 
Number of firms 8,824 8,824 8,123 8,123 7,364 7,364 6,054 6,054 
R-squared 0.631 0.632 0.632 0.632 0.633 0.633 0.644 0.644 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Period: 2005-2009. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and 
reported in brackets. Year and disaggregate industry-level dummies, random firm-level effects and firm-level 
control variables (TFP,…) are included in all specifications. ‘Net hourly wage’ is the log of the average hourly wage 
in the firm. ‘Exports’ is the log of the value of exports. ‘Offshoring’ is the log of the value of imports of goods 
belonging to the same industry as that of the importing firm (see Section 2 for details). The four samples considered 
are constructed according to a different sample selection criterion. For every firm*year we compute the ratio of 
exports to total sales (‘export intensity’) and the ratio of offshoring to total sales (‘offshoring intensity’). We then 
build four different samples: (1) we keep all observations (firm*year) with positive exports and imports; (2) we 
exclude observations below the 5th percentiles of both distributions of ratios; (3) we exclude observations below the 
10th percentiles and (4) we exclude observations below the 20th percentiles. 
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Figure B2: Frequency of Trade Activities (1996-2009, in % of total years)  
 
Notes: Each observation is a firm. The sample consists of all firms observed over the period 1996-2009 and for 
which we have balance-sheet information (BRN data set). We compute the ‘frequency of exports’ as the number of 
years a given firm reports positive exports divided by the total number of years this firm is observed in our data set. 
Similar calculations are made for offshoring. ‘Offshoring’ is defined as imports of goods belonging to the same 
industry as that of the importing firm (see Section 2 for details). The figure reports the distribution of those 
frequencies in our data. For instance, a little more than 60% of firms never export over our sample period. 
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Table B3: Variance Decomposition of Exports, Offshoring and Wages 
 
1996-2009 2005-2009 2002-2009 2005-2009 
Variance of 
log… Exports Offshoring Exports Offshoring 
Average 
hourly wage 
Average 
hourly wage 
Total 5.41 6.27 4.64 5.38 0.05 0.04 
Between 4.80 4.84 4.49 4.98 0.04 0.04 
Within 0.61 1.44 0.15 0.40 0.01 0.00 
Nr obs. 67,576 67,576 23,274 23,274 44,206 23,274 
Notes: The sample consists of the 8,123 firms in our estimating sample. For some variables, we are able to have 
information for a longer period 1996-2009 for trade and 2002-2009 for the average hourly wage at the firm level. 
‘hourly wage’ is the log of the average hourly wage in the firm. ‘Exports’ is the log of the value of exports. 
‘Offshoring’ is the log of the value of imports of goods belonging to the same industry as that of the importing firm 
(see Section 2 for details). We compute a decomposition of the variance of trade and wages for the period 2005-
2009 (our estimating period) and for the longer period. We report the total variance of the variables, the variance 
due to differences between firms (‘between’) and the variance due to differences over time within the same firm 
(‘within’). 
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Appendix C. Robustness of the Instrumentation Strategy 
 
Table C1: Stability Over Time of the set of Products and Countries (1996-2009) 
 Exports Offshoring 
 
Mean Median Mean Median 
 
    
Share of trade….     
Top 1 product 0.69 0.71 0.81 0.90 
Top 2 products 0.83 0.89 0.90 0.98 
Top 1 country 0.52 0.46 0.76 0.81 
Top 2 countries  0.67 0.66 0.88 0.93 
Top 1 product*country pair  0.36 0.43 0.68 0.68 
Top 2 product*country pairs  0.57 0.55 0.80 0.86 
     
Number of product changes ….     
Top 1 product 1.7 1 1.4 1 
Top 2 products 4.1 4 2.1 2 
Top 1 country 2.4 2 1.8 2 
Top 2 countries  4.1 4 2.9 3 
Top 1 product*country pair  3.8 3 2.7 2 
Top 2 product*country pairs  6.9 6 4.7 4 
     
Notes: The sample consists of the 8,123 firms of our estimating sample. Using customs data set on the period 1996-
2009, we select for each firm in a given year the main or the two main traded products. For that, we use the ratio of 
exports (resp. offshoring) of a product on total exports (resp. offshoring) of the firm in a given year at a very 
disaggregate level (HS6) over the period 1996-2009. We calculate the average share of those products among total 
exports (offshoring) of a given firm and how many times the major product (or top 2 products) is modified in a firm 
(on average over the period). We run the same analysis for countries of destination and origin and for the pairs 
product*country. ‘Offshoring’ is defined as imports of goods belonging to the same industry as that of the importing 
firm (see Section 2 for details). 
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Table C2: Frequency of the Set of Products and Countries of Origin/Destination (1996-2004) 
 
1st quartile Median 3rd quartile 
 
   
Exports    
Nr of firms with the same main product*country pair 3.8 10.8 25.7 
Nr of firms with the same Top 2 product*country pairs 1.0 1.8 3.9 
    
Offshoring     
Nr of firms with the same main product*country pair 5.65 13.0 32.9 
Nr of firms with the same Top 2 product*country pairs 1.0 2.7 5.9 
    
Notes: The sample consists of the 8,123 firms in our estimating sample. Using customs data set on the period 1996-
2009, we select for every firm the main pair of country*product (using the ratio of exports/offshoring to country c of 
product p on total exports/ offshoring) and we compute the number of firms exporting or importing the same main 
product*country pair as main (or top 2 main) product*country pair. For each year on the period 1996-2004, we 
calculate the 3 quartiles of the distribution and the table reports the mean of those statistics over the sample period. 
‘Offshoring’ is defined as imports of goods belonging to the same industry as that of the importing firm (see Section 
2 for details). 
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Table C3: First-stage IV Regressions - excluding China, Germany and the United States 
 Excluding China, Germany and the US 
 Exports Offshoring 
World demand (exports) 0.142*** 0.094* (0.037) (0.055) 
World supply (imports) 0.045 0.250*** (0.028) (0.056) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Observations 21,696 21,696 
Number of firms 7,574 7,574 
Overall R-squared 0.232 0.232 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Period: 2005-2009. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level 
and reported in brackets. Firm-level control variables, year dummies and firm fixed-effects are included in all 
specifications. ‘Exports’ is the log of the value of exports. ‘Offshoring’ is the log of the value of imports of goods 
belonging to the same industry as that of the importing firm (see Section 2 for details). Product shares entering 
world demand and world supply are calculated at their overall sample (1996-2004) firm value. The sample consists 
of firms of our estimating sample but for each firm we exclude from their exports/imports trade flows to/from 
China, Germany and the US and recalculate exports and imports and the instrumental variables for firms in our 
estimating sample. 
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Table C4: First-stage IV Regressions – Exchange Rates 
 Non-euro countries All countries 
 Exports Offshoring Exports Offshoring 
World demand (exports) 
0.113*** 0.095* 0.099*** 0.084* 
(0.035) (0.056) (0.032) (0.046) 
World supply (imports) 
0.059** 0.068 0.111*** 0.196*** 
(0.027) (0.052) (0.029) (0.053) 
Exchange rate (exports) 
0.890*** 0.162 0.474* -0.666** 
(0.165) (0.256) (0.246) (0.331) 
Exchange rate (imports) -0.299** 0.669*** -0.130 0.498* 
(0.126) (0.209) (0.164) (0.300) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,254 16,254 23,234 23,234 
Number of firms 5,960 5,960 8,100 8,100 
Overall R-squared 0.101 0.046 0.115 0.056 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Period: 2005-2009. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level 
and reported in brackets. Firm-level control variables, year dummies and firm fixed-effects are included in all 
specifications. ‘Exports’ is the log of the value of exports. ‘Offshoring’ is the log of the value of imports of goods 
belonging to the same industry as that of the importing firm (see Section 2 for details). Product shares entering 
world demand and world supply, Exchange rate (exports) and Exchange rate (imports) are calculated at their overall 
sample (1996-2004) firm value. The sample ‘all countries’ consists of our estimating sample (columns 1 and 2) and 
we build the sample ‘Non-euro countries’ by recalculating for all firms values of exports and imports and of 
instruments excluding trade with euro area countries (firms trading only with euro area countries are excluded). 
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Table C5: First-stage IV Regressions – Market Shares 
 Excluding observations for which the export/import market share is larger than… 
 10% 15% 20% 
 Exports Offshoring Exports Offshoring Exports Offshoring 
World demand 
(exports) 
0.109* 0.092 0.104** 0.053 0.079* 0.027 
(0.057) (0.067) (0.048) (0.050) (0.044) (0.049) 
World supply 
(imports) 
0.093** 0.135* 0.101** 0.132** 0.161*** 0.181*** 
(0.044) (0.077) (0.043) (0.064) (0.041) (0.065) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,299 17,299 19,777 19,777 21,055 21,055 
Number of firms 6,237 6,237 7,004 7,004 7,389 7,389 
Overall R-squared 0.459 0.459 0.495 0.495 0.500 0.500 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Period: 2005-2009. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level 
and reported in brackets. Firm-level control variables, year dummies and firm fixed-effects are included in all 
specifications. ‘Exports’ is the log of the value of exports. ‘Offshoring’ is the log of the value of imports of goods 
belonging to the same industry as that of the importing firm (see Section 2 for details). Product shares entering 
world demand and world supply, are calculated at their overall sample (1996-2004) firm value. The sample consists 
of firms of our estimating sample but we drop product-country observations for which the French export/import 
market share is less than a given percentage. To calculate the average market share of France in each country-
product pair, we use the BACI data and define the market share as the percentage of imports by country c of product 
p that have France as origin (same calculation for exports). Then, for each firm we drop observations product-
country-year for which the export/import market share is larger than a given percentage and, recalculate exports and 
imports and the instrumental variables. 
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Appendix D. Robustness – Wage equation 
 
 
 
Table D1: Firm-level Average Hourly Wage Regressions (All Workers, 2005-2008) 
 
Net hourly wage 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Exports 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.007*** 0.010*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Offshoring 0.006*** 0.012*** 0.003*** 0.003** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
    
TFP 
  0.021*** 0.020*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
Firm size 
  -0.004 -0.010*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
Capital/labour 
  0.014*** 0.015*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Share of high-skilled 
workers    0.425*** 0.423*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) 
Unemployment rate 
  0.001 0.001 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Temporary contracts   -0.040*** -0.040*** 
  
(0.011) (0.011) 
Domestic sales   0.004* 0.003 
  
(0.002) (0.002) 
Intercept 2.510*** 2.344*** 1.815*** 1.794*** (0.028) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) 
     
Controls No No Yes Yes 
IV No Yes No Yes 
     
Observations 19,045 19,045 19,045 19,045 
Number of firms 7,479 7,479 7,479 7,479 
R-squared 0.350 0.363 0.641 0.641 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Period: 2005-2008. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and 
reported in brackets. Year and disaggregate industry-level dummies, random firm-level effects are included in all 
specifications. ‘Net hourly wage’ is the log of the average hourly wage in the firm. ‘Exports’ is the log of the value 
of exports. ‘Offshoring’ is the log of the value of imports of goods belonging to the same industry as that of the 
importing firm (see Section 2 for details). Firm-level controls (size, TFP, capital/labour and domestic sales) are in 
logs. 
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Table D2: Firm-level Average Hourly Wage Regressions (all workers) (2005-2009) – Total Imports 
Dependent variable Net hourly wage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Exports 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.006*** 0.010*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Imports 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.004*** 0.003** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
    
TFP   0.024*** 0.023*** 
  
(0.003) (0.003) 
Firm size   -0.003 -0.008*** 
  
(0.003) (0.003) 
Capital/labour   0.013*** 0.013*** 
  
(0.003) (0.003) 
Share of high-skilled 
workers   0.381*** 0.379*** 
  
(0.011) (0.011) 
Unemployment rate   -0.000 -0.000 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Temporary contracts   -0.035*** -0.035*** 
  
(0.010) (0.010) 
Domestic sales   0.003 0.003 
  
(0.002) (0.002) 
Intercept 2.471*** 2.320*** 1.851*** 1.831*** (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
     
Controls No No Yes Yes 
IV No Yes No Yes 
     
Observations 23,269 23,269 23,269 23,269 
Number of firms 8,123 8,123 8,123 8,123 
R-squared 0.353 0.362 0.632 0.632 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Period: 2005-2009. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and 
reported in brackets. Year dummies and firm random effects are included in all specifications. ‘Net hourly wage’ is 
the log of the average hourly wage in the firm. ‘Exports’ is the log of the value of exports. ‘Imports’ is the log of the 
value of imports. Firm-level controls (size, TFP, capital/labour and domestic sales) are in logs.  
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Table D3: Firm-level Wage Regressions (by Occupation, 2005-2008) 
Dependent 
variable Ln (net hourly wage) 
         
 Blue collar White-collar Technicians Executives 
 OLS OLS-IV OLS OLS-IV OLS OLS-IV OLS OLS-IV 
         
Exports 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.001 0.001 0.005*** 0.004* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Offshoring 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
        
TFP 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.006 0.005 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Firm size 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.019*** -0.008** -0.008** 0.010** 0.009* 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Capital 
/labour 
0.011*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** -0.003 -0.003 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Share of 
high-skilled 
workers 
0.068*** 0.068*** 0.009 0.008 -0.093*** -0.094*** -0.040** -0.043*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) 
Unemp. rate 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Temporary 
contracts 
-0.047*** -0.047*** -0.084*** -0.085*** -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.049** -0.050** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) 
Domestic 
sales 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.010** 0.009** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Intercept 1.948*** 1.946*** 2.116*** 2.106*** 2.397*** 2.393*** 2.708*** 2.703*** (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.035) (0.035) (0.039) (0.040) 
         
IV No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 19,045 19,045 19,045 19,045 19,045 19,045 19,045 19,045 
Number of 
firms 7,479 7,479 7,479 7,479 7,479 7,479 7,479 7,479 
R-squared 0.414 0.414 0.246 0.247 0.186 0.186 0.189 0.189 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Period: 2005-2008. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and 
reported in brackets. Year and disaggregate industry-level dummies, random firm-level effects are included in all 
specifications. ‘Net hourly wage’ is the log of the average hourly wage by job occupation in the firm. ‘Exports’ is 
the log of the value of exports. ‘Offshoring’ is the log of the value of imports of goods belonging to the same 
industry as that of the importing firm (see Section 2 for details). Firm-level controls (size, TFP, capital/labour and 
domestic sales) are in logs.  
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Table D4: Firm-level Wage Regressions (by Occupation) (2005-2009) – Total Imports 
Dependent 
variable Net hourly wage 
         
 Blue collar White-collar Technicians Executives 
 OLS OLS-IV OLS OLS-IV OLS OLS-IV OLS OLS-IV 
         
Exports 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.002* 0.003* 0.003* 0.002 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Imports -0.001 -0.003** 0.002 0.001 0.004*** 0.003** 0.008*** 0.012*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
        
TFP 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.011** 0.011** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Firm size 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.018*** -0.008** -0.008** 0.012*** 0.011** (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Capital/labour 0.009** 0.009** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.012** 0.012** -0.002 -0.002 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Share of high-
skilled workers  
0.029*** 0.029*** -0.007 -0.008 -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.051*** -0.052*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
Unemp. rate -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Temporary 
contracts 
-0.049*** -0.048*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.037* -0.038* 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) 
Domestic sales 
0.004* 0.005** 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.008* 0.007* 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Intercept 
1.991*** 1.999*** 2.139*** 2.131*** 2.355*** 2.356*** 2.663*** 2.650*** 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.033) (0.039) (0.040) 
         
IV No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
         
Observations 23,269 23,269 23,269 23,269 23,269 23,269 23,269 23,269 
Nr of firms 8,123 8,123 8,123 8,123 8,123 8,123 8,123 8,123 
R-squared 0.416 0.416 0.258 0.258 0.185 0.185 0.187 0.188 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Period: 2005-2009. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and 
reported in brackets. Year and disaggregate industry-level dummies, random firm-level effects are included in all 
specifications. ‘Net hourly wage’ is the log of the average hourly wage by occupation in the firm. ‘Exports’ is the 
log of the value of exports. ‘Imports’ is the log of the value of imports. Firm-level controls (size, TFP, capital/labour 
and domestic sales) are in logs.  
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Table D5: Firm-level Wage Regressions by Bargaining Regime and by Occupation (2005-2009) –
Total Imports 
Firm wage agreement No No Yes 
Industry wage agreement No Yes - 
Total 
Exports 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.016*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
Imports 
-0.001 0.004** -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
    
R-Squared 0.625 0.604 0.735 
Blue-collar workers 
Exports 0.005** 0.004*** 0.011*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
Imports 
-0.005** -0.004** -0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) 
    
R-Squared 0.424 0.346 0.538 
White-collar workers 
Exports 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) 
Imports 
-0.006** 0.002 0.006* 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
    
R-Squared 0.276 0.202 0.365 
Technicians and supervisors 
Exports 0.005 0.002 0.009*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Imports 0.001 0.002 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
    
R-Squared 0.208 0.167 0.338 
Executives 
   
Exports 0.004 -0.000 0.012*** 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
Imports 0.003 0.015*** 0.003 
 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) 
    
R-Squared 0.192 0.163 0.315 
    
Observations 3,509 14,683 5,077 
Number of firms 2,556 6,124 1,293 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Period: 2005-2009. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and 
reported in brackets. Year and disaggregate industry-level dummies, random firm-level effects and firm-level 
controls are included in all specifications. ‘Net hourly wage’ is the log of the average hourly wage by occupation in 
the firm. ‘Exports’ is the log of the value of exports. ‘Imports’ is the log of the value of imports. The category 
‘Firm-level wage agreement’ is defined according to the frequency of firm-level wage agreements for a given firm, 
‘Yes’ corresponds to firms that agree on wages more than 20% of years over the period 2002-2009, ‘No’ less than 
20% of wage agreements over the same period. The category ‘Industry-level wage agreement’ means that a firm is 
covered by an industry-wage agreement in a given year.  
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Table D6: Firm-level Average Hourly Wage Regressions: by Bargaining Regime and Occupation 
Dependent variable Net hourly wage 
 
Existence of an 
agreement 
Agreement 
on wages 
Agreement on topics other 
than wages 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Blue-collar workers      
Exports 0.003*** 0.010*** 0.003*** 0.011*** 0.004*** 0.009** (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) 
Offshoring -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* 0.001 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
R-squared 0.587 0.731 0.598 0.736 0.597 0.743 
 
      
White-collar workers 
     
Exports 0.006*** 0.006* 0.006*** 0.006* 0.007*** 0.002 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) 
Offshoring -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.000 0.002 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
R-squared 0.194 0.359 0.206 0.364 0.214 0.362 
Technicians and engineers 
     
Exports 0.002 0.006** 0.002 0.007** 0.002 0.004 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) 
Offshoring 0.004*** 0.003 0.004*** 0.003 0.004*** 0.006*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
R-squared 0.157 0.336 0.162 0.340 0.166 0.396 
Executives 
     
Exports 0.002 0.011*** 0.002 0.011*** 0.003 0.009** (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
Offshoring 0.007*** 0.006** 0.008*** 0.006** 0.007*** 0.007** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
R-squared 0.148 0.308 0.155 0.317 0.156 0.337 
Observations 17,479 5,790 18,192 5,077 19,371 3,898 
Number of firms 6,624 1,499 6,830 1,293 7,107 1,016 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Period: 2005-2009. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and 
reported in brackets. Year and disaggregate industry-level dummies, random firm-level effects and firm-level 
control variables (TFP,…) are included in all specifications. ‘Net hourly wage’ is the log of the average hourly wage 
by occupation in the firm. ‘Exports’ is the log of the value of exports. ‘Offshoring’ is the log of the value of imports 
of goods belonging to the same industry as that of the importing firm (see Section 2 for details). The existence of 
agreements variable is defined as a dummy variable equal to one if a firm frequently signs agreements on any topic 
(wages + other topics) (columns 1 and 2). Columns 3 and 4 compare firms that frequently agree on wages and firms 
that do not frequently agree on wages (our baseline result). Columns 5 and 6 compare firms that frequently agree on 
other topics than wages and firms that do not frequently agree on other topics. 
 
 
